




EUI Working Paper ECO No. 92/96
The Targeting of Family Allowance 
in Hungary
S arah J. Jarvis 
and
John M icklewright




























































































3 0001 0013 8868 7
Please note
As from January 1990 the EUI Working Paper Series is 
divided into six sub-series, each sub-series is numbered 



























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 92/96
The Targeting of Family Allowance 
in Hungary
S a r a h  J. Ja r v is  
and
JOHN MICKLEWRIGHT




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the authors.
© Sarah J. Jarvis and John Micklewright 
Printed in Italy in October 1992 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































THE TARGETING OF FAMILY AT.mWANPE IN HUNGARY
Sarah J. Jarvis' and John Micklewright"
October 1992
European University Institute, Florence
European University Institute, Florence, and Queen Mary and Westfield 
College, University of London
(Revised version of paper presented at World Bank conference on "Public 
Expenditures and the Poor: Incidence and Targeting", Washington DC, 17-19 June 
1992)
Abstract
We consider the targeting of the family allowance in Hungary. In 1989, 
expenditure on family allowance accounted for half of government expenditure 
on non-pension social income in cash and 3 percent of GDP. We (i) show the 
development of the allowance scheme during the post-war period, (ii) 
investigate its incidence across the income distribution using household 
survey microdata relating to 1987, and (iii) consider arguments for bringing 
the family allowance into the base of the progressive personal income tax. 
We show that the choice of equivalence scale makes a substantial impact to the 
conclusions regarding incidence. We conclude against taxing the allowance.
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Family allowances, in the form of cash payments made by the state to 
families with children, are a common feature of social policy in 
industrialised countries. In Europe, this has applied both to the market 
economies of the West and the former command economies of the East. The level 
of family allowance, in relation to wages, was in general more generous in the 
latter, see Table 1 (although the pre-reform picture in Eastern Europe is more 
complicated that this suggests, see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, chapter 
8) .
The transition of the Eastern European economies towards a market system 
has resulted in attention being paid to the role of family allowance in the 
countries concerned. One view sees generous family allowance as a natural 
feature of a command economy but not of a market economy. It is argued that 
governments in command economies could, and did, hold down wages but returned 
some of the proceeds in the form of price subsidies and social income' in 
cash and kind, including generous family benefits. On this view, transition 
to the market economy implies a reduction in the ratio of family allowance to 
wages. A second view takes a more neutral position on the place of family 
allowance within an economic system. The lower family benefits in Western 
Europe may result from political choice rather than the natural features of 
a market economy. We note that reasoned arguments for substantially higher 
family allowances (coupled with other changes) have been put forward in the 
UK (Johnson et al, 1989, Parker and Sutherland, 1991). The maintenance of 
generous family allowance in Eastern Europe may be seen as desirable, but it 
is argued that macroeconomic stabilisation in the face of stagnant or negative 
growth reguires a reduction in government expenditure and a focus of cash 
support on those most in need. On this view, the debate is about targeting.
In this paper we consider the targeting of family allowance in Hungary. 
Hungary stands out in Table 1 as having the most generous family allowance in 
1980 among the six Eastern European countries illustrated. In 1989. 
expenditure on family allowance amounted to 20 percent of government 
expenditure on social income in cash (and half of non-pension expenditure), 
the total representing 3 percent of GDP (World Bank, 1992, Table 2.2, p.10). 
The family allowance scheme inherited by the incoming democratically elected 
government in May 1990 is a universal scheme. By this we mean that 




























































































characteristics of the household with no explicit reference to income or 
employment status. Family allowance in Hungary is paid to all families with 
children under the age of sixteen (and up until the age of twenty for those 
in full time education).1 The rate per child varies with family size and 
higher rates are paid to single parents. (The rates in August 1990 are shown 
in Table 2.)
In considering the situation in Hungary, we are not necessarily 
advocating either of the views expressed above of family allowance in 
transition economies. Rather, we are concerned that debate about the future 
of family support in Hungary should take account of a range of issues relevant 
to any discussion of targeting. There is a naive view that the targeting of 
a benefit paid without explicit reference to income must be inefficient by 
definition. But if the categorical criterion for receipt, in this case 
children, is correlated with low income, then targeting of a universal benefit 
may be much better than is presumed. The degree of targeting achieved is a 
matter for empirical research. We also believe that the debate should take 
place in the knowledge of what the pre-1990 system did or did not achieve. 
Discussion of reform of social security in any country is influenced by its 
history, not least since the past may condition the attitudes of those 
responsible for reform. In the case of Eastern Europe, the historical context 
may be particularly important if there exist negative feelings towards 
everything associated with the Communist period.
The pre-reform situation is the subject of the first two sections of the 
paper. In Section 1 we consider the evolution of the pre-1990 system of 
family allowance, using aggregate statistics on coverage and benefit levels. 
We show that coverage of all children by the allowance scheme in Hungary, in 
the practical as well as the formal sense, is a comparatively recent 
phenomenon. The level of the allowance in relation to wages was notably 
higher in 1990 than that shown for Hungary in 1980 by Table 1, which was in 
turn substantially above levels existing earlier in the post-war period. 
These trends can be expected to have influenced attitudes towards family 
support in Hungary and therefore the political economy of family policy.
In Section 2 we analyse the incidence of family allowance pre-reform
There is no age restriction on eligibility for family allowance 
if the child concerned is a permanent invalid and is looked after by the 





























































































using household microdata from the 1988 Income Survey conducted by the 
Hungarian CSO. We consider the share of family allowance going to each decile 
of the pre-allowance distribution of income. (This of course is only one of 
several possible measures of incidence.) The picture of pre-reform targeting 
varies with the equivalence scale which is chosen to allow for differences in 
family size, a choice which we emphasise is open to genuine debate and which 
may be affected by economic transition. The results could be used as 
ammunition by persons with a variety of views about the need for changes in 
targeting.
In Section 3 we consider a policy change which might improve the 
targeting of family allowance by introducing an explict link between receipt 
and income level, namely the inclusion of the allowance in the base for 
personal income taxation. This is a possibility that has been discussed in 
Hungary since the introduction of a progressive personal income tax in 1988. 
It may seem an attractive option since it would 'clawback' allowance from 
those with higher incomes whilst retaining the benefits of a universal 
allowance free of the well-known problems associated with means-testing. We 
discuss the unit of assessment for the personal income tax, the issue of 
existing child tax allowances, the administrative problems of taxing family 
allowance, and the degree of progression in the system. Taxation appears a 
much less attractive option that it might first seem and one which has become 
increasingly less attractive over time.
In the concluding section we remind the reader of those aspects relevant 
to the debate on targeting which we have not been able to consider and which 
would be worthy of more attention. In part this returns us to the theme of 
the first part of the paper since we note that payments of family allowance 
in Hungary in the past were much more differentiated by family size and 
composition than at present. This may have lessons for the present Government 
which appears to be moving towards family support through the tax system in 
a manner which is regressive, and which is therefore inconsistent with any 
view that family support in Hungary needs better targeting.
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY ALLOWANCE IH HUNGARY
The law making family allowance in Hungary a universal benefit, 
independent of employment status, was one of the last pieces of legislation 




























































































concerns that the law might be repealed by the new democratically elected 
coalition even before it come into effect (Adamik, 1991)). This recent change 
should not obscure the fact that family allowance in Hungary has a long 
history. It was introduced in 1938 and Hungary was the first Eastern European 
country to give cash benefits to families with children (Ferge, 1991, Table 
3.3) and among the first in Europe as a whole (Gordon, 1988, p.283). The 
benefit has never been subject to a means-test but up until April 1990 receipt 
of family allowance was conditional on a satisfactory employment record (and 
was funded out of the social insurance fund rather than the state budget). 
Ferge reports that payments were made only to parents with 21 days employment 
in a given month (1991a, p.20).
The payment of family allowance conditional on an employment record is 
an example of the underlying principle of much of social security provision 
in pre-reform Eastern Europe. Benefits were often restricted to those who 
could demonstrate current or past employment in the socialised sector (Ferge, 
1991, Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, chapter 8). Prior to 1990 family 
allowance in Hungary was restricted to the children of those persons working 
in the state sector or in agricultural co-operatives. Table 3 summarises the 
changes in the post-war period in the rules relating to the type of employment 
and family size. The table gives a general picture of increasing coverage 
over time.7 Two features may be noted. First, the 1990 changes not only 
removed the employment rules on eligibility but also extended the allowance 
to all children in the family, something which had existed previously only in 
1946-1953 and then only for families of state sector employees. Secondly, 
prior to 1975, agricultural co-operative families received less favourable 
treatment with lower rates of benefit and, until 1966, a restricted coverage 
of smaller families.
How did the rule changes in Table 3 translate into changes in numbers 
of children for whom family allowance was paid? In Figure 1 we show for 1950 
to 1990 the number of children for whom any family allowance was paid in each 
year as a proportion of the number of children in the population in that year 
aged less than 15. The denominator in this calculation is not ideal as it 
excludes some older children who are eligible, but the calculation provides
We do not know if the rule concerning the number of days of work 
in the month, described by Ferge, changed over time or whether it was the same 
throughout the post-war period. Members of agricultural co-operatives had to 
demonstrate 120 days of work (80 days for women) in the preceding year 




























































































a reasonable indication of changing coverage in the post-war period.
From 1985 onwards the numbers of children covered by family allowance 
exceeded the total number of children aged less than 15. That coverage was 
not in fact complete is shown by the sharp rise in the proportion between 1989 
and 1990, from 107 percent to 117 percent. This reflects both the extension 
to the children of non-employed parents and the payment in respect of all 
children under 16 irrespective of family size or age of the child. Prior to 
the mid-1980s coverage was significantly lower. In 1975 the proportion 
illustrated in Figure 1 was 79 percent and if we go back to 1950 we find a 
figure of less than 50 percent. Between 1965 and 1985 we see a fairly steady 
increase.
In addition to coverage, we need also to consider the development of the 
level of payments of family allowance. Has the relationship between family 
allowance and average earnings in Hungary always been that shown for 1980 in 
Table 1? Figure 2 sheds some light on this. In view of changes which have 
occurred during the post-war period in the relative rates for different family 
sizes we provide three series, taking in each case the same average earnings 
denominator. The numerators are:
the two-child rate of family allowance (both parents present, state 
sector employee)
the average payment per family receiving family allowance 
the average payment per child covered by family allowance 
For the first two series we have figures from 1949. The series for the 
average payment per child is shown from 1959. Looking first at 1980, the year 
which was the subject of the international comparison of Table 1, we see that 
the average payment per family was the same as the 2 child rate in 1980 shown 
in that Table - 25 percent of the average wage - while the average payment 
per child was 15 percent of the average wage.
The 1980 figures were notably higher than those for earlier years in the 
post-war period. The series for the average payment per family displays a 
sequence since 1950 of sharp increases followed by gradual and smaller 
declines. The movement of this series reflects both changes in coverage and 
changes in benefit rates. As regards the latter, the 2 child rate was 
unchanged between 1951 and 1965, thus declining relative to average wages, and 
then was fixed again from 1966 to 1973. The average payment per family in 
1950 was only 6 percent of the average wage, about a quarter of its 1980 




























































































percent of the average wage. It is not until 1975 that the average payment 
per child reaches 10 percent of the average wage.
Turning to the period after 1980, it can be seen that in 1987 the 
average payment per child and the payment for 2 children are about the same 
as in 1980, relative to the average wage, while the series for the average 
payment per family declines somewhat reflecting the extension of coverage to 
certain single child families in 1983 (see Table 3). In 1988 all three series 
display a sharp increase which is repeated in 1989. The slight fall in the 
two average payments series in 1990, in contrast to the 2 child/2 parent 
series, probably reflects the extension of coverage to all single child 
families in that year.
By 1989 the average payment per family represented 36 percent of the 
average wage and the average payment per child, 21 percent. What were the 
reasons for the policy change in 1988-89 which led to these figures being some 
70 percent higher than those for 1987? One reason is the phasing out of 
consumer price subsidies which led the government to increase family allowance 
to compensate for the change in real incomes. A second reason is the 
introduction of a progressive personal income tax in Hungary in January 1988. 
Wages in the main job of persons employed in the state and co-operative 
sectors were increased so as to ensure that net wages remained the same. 
(This has no impact on the denominator of the series in Figure 2 since we have 
calculated average earnings in 1988-90 by adjusting the 1987 figure using a 
net earnings index.) However, incomes from second jobs - a widespread 
phenomenon of the Hungarian labour market - were subjected to the new tax. 
Thus, as a result of the tax,
"In the case of those having incomes from several sources, the
summarized (after-tax) real income may decline--- The surplus of
state revenues deriving therefrom [the tax] has to be used - by 
increasing family allowance - to ease the situation of families 
with children" (Ministry of Finance, 1987, p.7).
In effect, higher family allowance was used to legitimise the introduction of 
taxation, or at least to legitimise its treatment of the family, a subject we 
return to below.
The family allowance scheme in Hungary has a long history which can be 
expected to be an important influence on the expectations of the electorate 
and the decisions of policy makers. Taking the post-war period as a whole 




























































































scheme and in the level of payments relative to average wages. The extension 
of the scheme to full universal coverage in 1990 and the increases in benefit 
rates in 1988-89 should be seen in the context of the earlier history.
2. THE PRE-1990 TARGETING OF FAMILY ALLOWANCE
In this section we try and shed some light on the targeting of family 
allowance in the pre-reform period using household survey micro-data. The 
definition we take of "targeting" is important to spell out. We look at the 
proportion of total family allowance expenditure going to each decile of the 
pre-family allowance income distribution. This means that targeting, on this 
measure, is improved by any reform of family allowance which cuts the share 
of expenditure going to the upper parts of the distribution. This could be 
achieved by either a reduction in payments to higher income households or an 
increase in expenditure on lower income households (or both). The distinction 
is an important one. If our criterion of targeting were to be the reduction 
of poverty then merely cutting expenditure to high income households would do 
nothing to improve targeting.
Family Allowance and the 1988 Income Survey
The data source we use is the 1988 Income Survey conducted by the 
Hungarian CSO, which collected information on annual incomes in 1987.5 This 
survey was the sixth in a line of guinnenial surveys begun in 1963. (We draw 
here on the description of the survey given in Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1992, Sources and Methods.) The survey aims to sample all private households 
of Hungarian citizens resident in the country in the reference year. Response 
to the Income Survey has been quite high: the 1988 survey had a response rate 
of 83 percent with refusal accounting for less than a third of non-response. 
The achieved sample size of 19,856 households was also quite large by 
international standards. As the name indicates, the principal purpose of the 
survey is to collect information on individual and household incomes. 
Detailed information is sought on annual income from all sources, including 
second jobs, agricultural income in kind, tips, and social security benefits. 
Reported earnings in the first job were checked with employers, taking into
We use the original microdata from the 1987 Income Survey (and not 
the database formed for the Incidence Study of Kupa and Fajth (1990) from this 




























































































account any changes of employment during the year. The assessment of this 
source by Atkinson and Micklewright (1992, chapter 3) is that it compares 
favourably with household income data available in Western countries, taking 
the sources in the UK as a yardstick.
The amounts of family allowance recorded in the survey are calculations 
made by the CSO based on a combination of information provided by the 
responding households and tables of benefit rates. If a household indicated 
that it received family allowance during the year the CSO calculated the 
annual figure on the basis of the number, age, and educational activity of the 
children, taking into account whether one or two parents are present. This 
clearly may be expected to result in a higher degree of accuracy than annual 
figures based solely on respondent recall. There are 7,863 households in the 
1988 survey with recorded family allowance.*
The grossed-up aggregate amount of family allowance recorded in the 
Income Survey may be compared with that in administrative statistics. We 
multiply the sum of annual family allowance recorded in the (unweighted) data 
by the ratio of the Hungarian population on 1st January 1988 (10,464 thousand) 
to the number of individuals in the survey (56,439). The resulting figure is 
106 percent of the total family allowance expenditure in 1987 recorded in 
administrative sources (population and family allowance expenditure totals 
from Statistical Yearbook 1990, Tables 1.1 and 14.4). We suspect that the 
small over-statement of allowance in the Income Survey is the result of 
greater than average response by households with children.
The CSO calculates weighting factors for the survey which adjust for 
some non-proportional elements in the sampling procedure (which has a 
stratified random design). We use these weights in the rest of the paper. 
(These weights do not take into account any differential non-response.)
The Income Survey data allow us to see how important in practice were 
family allowance payments in total household incomes in 1987. The figures 
given in Section 1 for the average payments as a percent of average earnings 
provide an indication of changes in the generosity of the benefit over time 
but they do not show the importance of the allowance for individual families.
In calculating this number we exclude 640 households with one 
child aged over six who have a small payment recorded as "family allowance" 
despite the rules in 1987 excluding them from this benefit. We understand 
from the Hungarian CSO that the figures reflect a coding of a state transfer 
that is not family allowance and we do not treat it as part of family 




























































































A family receiving the allowance may have two earners - the normal pattern for 
married couples in Eastern European countries - and there may in addition be 
other sources of income, notably, in the case of Hungary, the second economy. 
On the other hand, there may be some households with total income who rely 
heavily on the family allowance as a major source of income, for example 
single-parent households.
To shed light on this issue we take all households in the Income Survey 
who received family allowance during 1987 and calculate the share of their 
total annual net income accounted for by their allowance payments (taking no 
account of differences in household size). We then rank the households by the 
value of this share and summarise the distribution in Table 4. The table 
shows that for 60 percent of households receiving family allowance, the 
payments they received made up less than 10 percent of their net income; for 
nearly a third of households the share was less than 5 percent. Family 
allowance constituted more than 20 percent of income for less than a tenth of 
households with the benefit. While this is a significant minority, it 
suggests that the relationship between the average payment per family in 1987 
and the average wage, shown earlier in Figure 2, is not a good indicator of 
the importance of family allowance in household incomes at that time.
Measuring the incidence of family allowance
We now turn to look at the targeting of family allowance in 1987. As 
explained earlier we look at the share of total family allowance expenditure 
received by each decile of the distribution of net household income. We 
include all households in the Income Survey for the purpose of these 
calculations, not just those who have children or who actually received family 
allowance. Our purpose is to consider the incidence of family allowance in 
the population as a whole.
In doing so, there are a number of methodological issues which need to 
be made clear. First, our unit of the analysis is the household, defined in 
the Hungarian data as a group of persons living in the same dwelling who 
partly or entirely share expenses. An alternative, which might give rather 
different results, would be to look at the incidence of family allowance 
across the distribution of families, defined as persons or couples plus any 
dependent children.
Secondly, in view of the size of the family allowance payments, we look 




























































































income. That is, we subtract any recorded allowance from each household 
before ranking them in the distribution on the basis of their incomes 
(adjusting for size and composition of the household as explained below). It 
is important to note however that the distribution of incomes minus the 
allowance does not necessarily represent the distribution which would have 
existed in the absence of the family allowance system. The changes in labour 
supply and other aspects of household behaviour which might have occured in 
the absence of the allowance need to be taken into account. The same applies 
to increased entitlement to means-tested benefits which can be expected to 
have resulted. In common with other Eastern European countries, means-tested 
social assistance benefit in pre-reform Hungary was less developed than in 
Western countries (Ferge, 1991, Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, chapter 8). 
But it is still the case that in 1987, the year covered by the Income Survey 
data we use, there were over half a million "one-off" emergency social 
assistance payments to adults, and in addition a separate scheme providing 
cover for children (World Bank, 1992, p .177, Zam, 1991.)
The third issue is the treatment of household size and composition in 
our calculations. What equivalence scale should be applied to the income of 
each household in the distribution? This can be expected to have a major 
impact on the results which are obtained. We wish to look at the incidence 
of a benefit related to the number of children, and, via the equivalence scale 
adjusting for household size and composition, the number of children will in 
part determine a household's rank in the income distribution and hence the 
picture of family allowance incidence.
It has been a common practice in Eastern European statistics on the 
distribution of income to consider household per capita income (Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1992, chapter 3). In the case of Hungary, this was the practice 
adopted by the study of the incidence in 1989 of social income in cash and 
kind and of price subsidies, funded by the World Bank (Kupa and Fajth, 1990, 
and World Bank, 1992). Such an equivalence scale could be expected to result 
in more large families being nearer to the bottom of the income distribution 
than would be the case with an alternative scale, with obvious consequences 
for the picture of incidence of family allowance.
The choice of equivalence scale reflects judgement about both technical 
issues such as economies of scale in consumption and value judgements about 
the priority assigned to the needs of different groups, such as children and 




























































































in Western countries, might be considered appropriate in the pre-reform period 
due to low housing costs (a "fixed cost") or the oft-expressed position that 
children were "put first". But in our view, it is important to recognise the 
diversity of opinion as to the appropriate equivalence scale and we present 
results on a number of different bases.
The differences between equivalence scales have been summarised by 
Buhmann et al (1988) who suggest that the measure of income entering the 
distribution may be written as:
E - Y/H°
where E is equivalised income, Y is total household income, H is household 
size and a is the elasticity of household needs with respect to household 
size. For example, the OECD equivalence scale of 1 for the first adult, 0.7 
for other adults and 0.5 for each child, corresponds broadly to a value of a 
equal to 0.7. A 10 percent increase in household size leads, with this value 
of a, to a 7 percent increase in household needs. We show the effect of 
taking four different equivalence scales. We consider the distribution of:
1) household per capita income, which corresponds to setting the parameter 
a equal to 1 in the Buhmann et al formula:
2) total household income, which corresponds to setting a = 0;
3) C50 equivalised income, in which total household income is divided by 
an equivalence scale used by the Hungarian CS0 for the 1988 Income 
Survey. This is given in the notes to Figure 3. For a household with 
a couple and 2 children in which at least one adult works it 
corresponds to a value of a in the range 0.66 - 0.89, depending on the 
age of the children and whether the second adult works.’
4) OECD equivalised income, in which total household income is divided by 
the OECD equivalence scale described above and which as noted 
corresponds approximately to setting a = 0.7.
The adjustments in the first two distributions represent the extreme values 
of a; the per capita scale (o = 1) implies maximum adjustment with no account
In calculating this range for a for the CS0 scale from the 
information in the notes to Figure 3, we have treated the first adult as 
having a value 1.0 and the second adult and children as having the values 
given divided by 1.2. This allows for the additional fixed cost element of 





























































































taken of any economies of scale with increasing household size; the total 
household income distribution (a = 0), on the other hand, implies that there 
is no change in household needs as size increases. The third and fourth 
distributions are based on intermediate values. The CSO scale takes more 
account of household composition than does the OECD scale, needs varying with 
activity status and age in addition to adult/child status.
Some readers may feel this discussion of equivalence scales in terms of 
needs ignores any argument that household size in a developed country is a 
matter of choice and that children may generate private benefits as well as 
costs. This choice might in part be affected by the existence of family 
policy such as generous family allowance payments.6 This is a well known 
problem with the equivalence scale literature: for example, scales that are 
derived from econometric estimates are conditional on choice of household 
size; they reflect the costs of children to the family but not the benefits. 
However, it is important to remember that the choice over size is one made by 
the parents rather than the children, and the welfare of both must be taken 
into account. Household size has a significant impact on household costs, and 
hence the children's welfare; this provides a rationale for the use of 
econometric estimates of equivalence scales that condition on the choice of 
size.7
This leads us to the final methodological issue. What weight should 
each household receive in calculating the distribution of income? Should we 
look at the distribution of households' income equivalised by the different 
scales we have discussed or should we consider the distribution of equivalised 
household income of the individuals which make up those households? Here we 
feel the choice to be clear, and that the distribution of individuals is the 
one to be considered, implying that each household receives a weight equal to 
household size, H, in our calculations. Having adjusted for differences in 
needs between households with an equivalence scale, each member of every
A review of Hungarian research based on longitudinal data into the 
effect of cash transfer programmes on fertility is given in ILO (1989, p.87). 
This research concluded that the programmes considered had at most altered the 
timing of births but not their number.
In their disucussion of the theoretical basis for equivalence 
scales, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, p .211) address this point explicitly in 
the context of income maintenance policy for families with children. See also 
Coulter et al (1992, p.90) who note that the decision to have children is 




























































































household should be treated in the distribution as an "equal citizen".* 
Therefore our calculations of incidence refer to the distribution of 
individual s' equivali sed household pre-allowance incomes.
The incidence of family allowance in 1987
Figure 3 shows the share of total family allowance expenditure recorded 
in the 1988 Income Survey data going to each decile of individuals in the pre­
allowance income distribution.’ The results provide evidence in support of 
conflicting views on the degree of targeting of family allowance in 1987. The 
person who wished to argue that the benefit was quite well targeted on low 
income households would point to the per capita distribution. Nearly a 
quarter of expenditure goes to the poorest 10 percent of individuals in the 
population and two-fifths to the poorest 20 percent. About one twelfth of 
expenditure goes to the richest 20 percent of the population. The person 
arguing that family allowance expenditure was "wasted" on high income 
households could point to the total household income distribution: the richest 
20 percent of individuals capture a fifth of the expenditure - one and a half 
times more than is taken by the bottom 20 percent - and the bottom 10 percent 
get least of all.
Neither calculation would be convincing to the person who rejects the 
lack of equivalising in the total income distribution (a = 0) but who believes 
that the use of a per capita scale (a = 1) goes too far. The overall picture 
given by either the OECD scale or the Hungarian CS0 scale is similar to that 
with the per capita scale, in that the share of expenditure going to each 
decile of income declines as income rises. (This may reflect the fact that 
the values of a implied by these scales are closer to one than to zero.) The 
CSO scale gives results which are particularly close to those obtained with 
the per capita adjustment and over 20 percent of expenditure still goes to the 
bottom decile. If we look at the bottom two deciles, 40 percent of family 
allowance expenditure is received when the per capita scale is used, 35 
percent with the CSO scale and 32 percent with the OECD scale. One reason for 
the difference in results between the OECD and CSO scales may be the more
As noted by Danziger and Taussig (1979) this is consistent with 
individualistic welfare functions.
The data on which Figure 3 is based are given in the Appendix, 
where we also show (for purposes of comparison) results for the household 




























































































sophisticated adjustment in the latter for differences in age and activity
status.
These results refer to 1987 when the family allowance system was not 
paid on a universal basis. The extension of the allowance in 1990 to those 
not working in the socialised sector may have increased the share of 
expenditure going to low income households, in other words to have improved 
targeting on our criterion.
Our analysis of the incidence of family allowance demonstrates the 
importance of making explicit the assumptions inherent in different measures 
of household income and of providing results on a variety of bases. As this 
illustrates, the debate about targeting involves choices about measurement and 
these choices will affect the conclusions which are drawn.
3. TAXING FAMILY ALLOWANCE
In the rest of the paper we turn to the question of improving the 
targeting of the universal family allowance in Hungary by subjecting the 
allowance to progressive income taxation. Reducing the value of family 
allowance to higher income households would indeed improve targeting using the 
criterion we employed in the last Section: the share of total expenditure 
going to lower income deciles. This will of course not be true for all 
criteria; merely taxing family allowance will not reduce poverty and could 
indeed increase poverty.
Our choice to consider the option of taxation, rather than a more direct 
income link via a means-test, reflects our view that family allowance should 
continue to be paid on a universal basis since we believe that the arguments 
for this are strong. First, there are the arguments which can be made in any 
society. The payment of universal family allowance is a recognition of the 
private costs of raising children with a view to equalising consumption across 
households of different sizes. A universal allowance free of an income-test 
provides support with little or no problems of take-up at low administrative 
cost. It provides protection against income instability arising from 
unemployment (if payments continue without interruption in the event of job 
loss) or, if the allowance is paid to the parent caring for the children, in 
the event of marital breakdown.
Secondly, there are the arguments based on the history of the allowance 




























































































the introduction of the universal principle in 1990, suggests that to abandon 
the universal nature of the allowance could be a politically destabilising 
act. This might prejudice the economic reforms which are taking place. Of 
course, the transition from Communism to a market economy requires a change 
in the attitudes of the population in many aspects of economic and social 
life. But we do not feel that a universal allowance is an unnatural feature 
of Hungarian social policy and we remind the reader of the widespread 
occurrence of universal family allowance in the market economies of the West.
At first sight, the inclusion of family allowance within the base of the 
personal income tax introduced in Hungary in 1988 would be an obvious step if 
the worry is that excessive expenditure is going to high income households. 
The personal income tax (PIT) in Hungary has a progressive rate structure. 
Subjecting family allowance to tax would reduce its value to higher income 
parents while leaving the full value available to those with lower incomes. 
The IMF report, Social Security Reform in Hungary, recommended such a move 
(Kopits et al, 1990). However, there a number of issues which need to be 
considered. These suggest that targeting via the tax system is neither as 
easy nor as desirable as one might first think. First, there is the unit of 
assessment for the PIT as compared to that appropriate to the consideration 
of household welfare. Secondly, and related to this, we need to consider the 
existence of any provisions in the PIT giving preferential treatment to 
persons with children. Does the PIT provide any support to children which may 
become illogical if family allowance is to be subject to tax? Thirdly, there 
are the administrative problems of taxing family allowance to be considered. 
Fourthly, we need to consider the effective progression of the PIT and the 
changes over time. We consider these points in turn.
Unit of Assessment
The unit of assessment for the PIT is the individual. Each member of 
a household is taxed independently and there are no additional tax allowances 
for marriage. Tax liability depends solely on individual income. Family 
allowance on the other hand is, as the name indicates, a benefit paid to 
families. Our discussion of targeting in Section 2 related to the incomes of 
the still wider unit of the household. If our interest in targeting is due 
to concern over living standards of families or households (on the assumption 
that income is pooled at these levels) then the distinction between these 




























































































In practice we understand that the family allowance can be paid to 
either husband or wife. Although this may be of considerable importance to 
the financial arrangements made within individual marriages, it has no 
implications at the present time for other parts of the tax and social 
security system. If family allowance were brought into the PIT base it would 
become necessary to indicate the parent for whom the allowance would be 
treated as taxable income. This raises the question of equity between parents 
and it implies that considerations of vertical equity between families (or 
households) may not be fully taken into account. Assume there is freedom of 
choice or that the allowance is treated as the mother's income. If the 
participation rate of married women in Hungary is related negatively to the 
income of their husbands then the tax paid on family allowance may actually 
fall with increasing family (or household) income. More generally the degree 
to which taxation of the allowance under the PIT improves its targeting 
according to family or household incomes depends on the joint distribution of 
incomes of married couples - an empirical question which we have yet to 
establish.
Tax treatment of the family
As has been noted by Hethy,
"critics have looked upon the Hungarian personal income taxation 
as 'antisocial' i.e. punitive to individuals with families and 
children." (1991, p .8).
Although the PIT embodies independent treatment of husband and wife, from the 
outset in 1988 a small recognition of the family was introduced in the form 
of a tax allowance for three or more children (two or more children for single 
parents). The allowance goes to the parent with the higher income (Ministry 
of Finance, 1987, section 17). The allowance is quite small, just 1,000 
forints per month during 1988-91, which may be compared with an average 
monthly (gross) earnings in 1988 of 8,817 forints (Statistical Yearbook, 1989, 
p . 19). Its presence has not been sufficient to assuage the critics of the PIT 
noted by Hethy. Throughout the history of the PIT there has been pressure to 
extend this allowance, to which the democratic government elected in 1990 has 
proved sympathetic. For example, in September 1990 Prime Minister Josef 
Antal 1 stressed the need:




























































































and families with children of their extra burden." (quoted in the East
European Reporter Vol.4 No.3, Autumn/Winter 1990).
In January 1992 the tax allowance for the third child was increased from 
12,000 to 15,600 forints per year and, more significantly, extended to all 
children, irrespective of family size.
The child tax allowance may be set against tax liability at the 
individual's highest marginal rate. It is worth nothing to the person not 
liable to tax and worth most (in absolute terms) to those facing the maximum 
marginal rate. It would therefore make little sense to retain this tax 
allowance and yet to subject the family allowance to progressive taxation. 
The conversion of the tax allowance into an addition to the family allowance 
for large families would in our view be a pre-requisite for bringing family 
allowance into the PIT base. In extending the availability of the child tax 
allowance (a step we think most regrettable) the Government has done little 
to bolster any argument for bringing the family allowance into the PIT base.
Administrative issues
The administrative problems which would arise from taxing family 
allowance may be illustrated by considering two possible methods of taxing the 
allowance.
(i) The tax due on the family allowance is deducted at source, i.e. by the 
agent responsible for the payment of the benefit. This requires that the 
agent knows the correct marginal tax rate of the recipient on each occasion 
that a payment is made, taking into account other sources of income. While 
the family allowance continues to be paid with the wage packet through state 
sector employers (as is the case for many recipients at present) this does not 
present a problem for a large section of the work force. But this form of 
delivering family allowance is not particularly desirable and may well not be 
retained.
(ii) Each family receives the full benefit gross of tax. At the end of the 
tax year the appropriate parent files a tax return including a declaration of 
the amount of family allowance received, something which may be verified by 
the tax authorities by reference to central records on family allowance 
payments. Any tax due on the allowance is then paid. This system would 
correspond to that which we understand is used to claim the child tax 
allowances, i.e. an end-of-year adjustment of liability. However, there is 




























































































to a tax rebate, the declaration of family allowance would lead to additional 
tax being due. Families who find themselves in financial difficulties at the 
time when the tax must be paid (caused for example by unexpected unemployment 
or family break-up) might be unable to pay and, given the value of the family 
allowance, even the family in "normal" circumstances might be obliged to save 
during the year merely to pay the tax. This does not seem desirable.
In both cases, a larger amount of additional information must be given 
to the appropriate authority than is required in the administration of family 
allowance free of tax. Furthermore, the extension of the tax base could 
create even greater incentives for tax evasion in the form of the non­
disclosure of income if the inclusion of family allowance in the tax base 
pushes a tax payer into a higher tax bracket.
Progression in the PIT
When introduced in 1988, the PIT had 10 positive marginal rates, ranging 
from 20 percent to a top rate of 60 percent. The tax system has since been 
progressively simplified with a large reduction in the number of marginal 
rates of tax and a substantial reduction in the top rate. As of 1992 there 
are only 3 positive rates: 25 percent, 35 percent and 40 percent.10 If the 
aim is to target family allowance via the tax system then progression is an 
essential feature; the simplification of the tax system can be expected to 
have substantially reduced its use in this respect.
In practice what matters is the effective progression. What is 
important is the actual distribution of marginal tax rates rather than the 
tabulated rates. In Table 5 we show our estimates of the distribution of 
marginal tax rates on first economy earnings for September 1988 and September 
1990 (the most recent earnings distribution data available to us). The 
estimates are based on our application of the tax schedule to grouped data on 
the distribution of earnings, something made possible by the independent 
treatment of husband and wife in the PIT, described above.11 (The data source 
is described in Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, Sources and Methods.) It 
should be noted that these estimates give only part of the story. There are 
other sources of income to consider - an aspect we stressed in another context
Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report on Hungary, No 1, 1992,
P-12.





























































































in Section 2 - which may mean that the actual marginal rate at which the 
family allowance would be taxed could be higher.
Looking first at 1990, the table shows two-thirds of individuals 
estimated as paying the same marginal rate - 30 percent - on first economy 
earnings in this year. By contrast, the modal tax bracket in 1988 - 20 
percent - contained less than a quarter of employees. We also see that the 
revenue generated from taxing family allowance would probably be notably lower 
if the allowance was treated as the income of the mother: the tax rates at the 
margin on first economy earnings for women appear significantly lower on 
average. The message from the table seems clear. The reforms to the PIT 
introduced by the incoming democratic government in 1990 appear to have 
significantly weakened the potential of the PIT for targeting family 
allowance. The further simplification to just three positive rates in 1992 
is unlikely to have improved matters.
In this section we have considered the problems with bringing family 
allowance into the base of the progressive personal income tax (PIT) as a 
means of reducing its value to those with higher incomes. We believe that 
there is little to merit such a move. The unit of assessment for taxation is 
inappropriate for the targeting of family allowance; the administrative 
problems are not insignificant; the degree of progression in the PIT may be 
insufficient to target the allowance effectively. We also note with regret 
the extension in 1992 of the system of child tax allowances.
CONCLUSIONS
Family allowances are an important part of social policy in Hungary. 
In this paper we have (i) documented the post-war development of the scheme, 
(ii) analysed the incidence of family allowance using household survey data, 
and (iii) considered the taxation of the allowance as a way of reducing 
expenditure going to higher income households.
The reader who is looking for firm conclusions about the degree of 
targeting of family allowance in Hungary will be disappointed. We have 
stressed that the picture of targeting will depend in part on the method of 
measurement which is used. We have used just one criterion of targeting - the 
incidence across the income distribution - but even here there are a number 
of choices concerning measurement which must be made, notably the choice of 




























































































difference to the results.
Our conclusions regarding the desirabli1ity of taxing family allowance 
are more clear-cut: we do not believe that this would be a good policy change, 
although more detailed use of household survey data than we have made here 
would throw more light on this issue. The unit of assessment in the Hungarian 
income tax system and the degree of progression in this system are not those 
which are most suited to the use of taxation as a targeting mechanism.
Without changing the fundamental criteria for receipt of family 
allowance, there are changes to the administration of the scheme which could 
help improve targeting but which we have not considered in detail in this 
paper. Payment to the mother (except where the father has custody) could be 
expected to be the most effective way of ensuring that the children get the 
full benefit of the allowance. Payment of the allowance through an agency 
unrelated to the workplace (for example, post offices) would ensure 
uninterrupted payment in the event of job loss.
As regards more significant changes, there are a number of alternatives 
to the taxation of the allowance, which we have not considered. One would be 
to target more effectively by demographic characteristics. Payments of family 
allowance in Hungary in the 1950s and 1950s were much more differentiated by 
family size and composition than at present. Such a system of family support 
may be more attractive than a policy of child tax allowances which are 






























































































Family allowances for two children 





















Note: The figures for Denmark, West Germany, Norway and Sweden refer to 1981 
and that for Poland to 1984.





























































































Rates of Family Allowance. August 1990
Both Parents Present
Family Allowance, August 1990 




Fourth plus Child 2,300
Both Parents Present





Note: All allowances are Ft 100 per month higher up to the age of three 





























































































Changes in Rules on Entitlement to Family Allowance. 1946-1990
1946 Allowance given only to state sector employees; members of 
agricultural co-operatives excluded from receipt. No 
restriction according to number of children.
1953 (March) Coverage extended to families of members of agricultural 
co-operatives with three or more children but at lower 
benefit rate than for families of state sector employees. 
Coverage of state sector employees restricted to families 
with two or more children.
1959 (April) Coverage extended to all single mothers with one or two 
children.
1966 (July) Coverage extended to all agricultural co-operatives with 
two or more children.
1972 (January) Coverage extended to all families with one child qualifying 
for the allowance where there were previously two or more 
qualifying.
1975 (July) Benefit rates for agricultural co-operative families raised 
to the level of that for families of state sector 
employees.
1983 (July) Coverage extended to families with only one child aged 
under six.
1990 (April) Universal allowance, independent of employment status and 
coverage extended to families with only one child over six.
Source





























































































Distribution of share of family allowance 
in total net household income among 
households receiving the allowance. 1987













We take all households in the Income Survey who received family allowance 
during 1987 and calculate the share of their total annual net income accounted 
for by their allowance payments (taking no account of differences in household 
size). We then rank the households by the value of this share; the results 
of this exercise are shown above in terms of the deciles of the distribution 
of the share. There are 25 households in the top decile with shares in excess 
of 50 percent and the figure of 81.4 percent is for the household with the 
highest recorded share.





























































































Fstimat.es of the distribution of marainal tax rates
on first economy earninas in 1988 and 1990
Tax bracket marginal tax % of employees paying a1
(Ft./month) rate (%) this rate
all men women
a) 1988
up to 5,000 0 15.3 7.8 24.3
5,000-6,833 20 23.2 17.5 29.6
6,833-8,500 25 19.8 20.5 18.8
8,500-11,000 30 19.9 24.1 14.7
11,000-13,500 35 10.0 13.1 6.8
13,500-16,000 39 5.0 6.9 2.8
16,000-21,000 44 4.1 5.8 2.0
21,000-31,000 48 2.0 3.0 0.7
31,000-51,000 52 0.5 1.0 0.1
51,000+ 56-60 0.2 0.2 0.1
b) 1990
up to 5,583 0 4.0 2.9 5.1
5,583-8,500 15 22.6 15.3 30.4
8,500-26,000 30 67.1 73.1 60.8
26,000-42,667 40 4.9 6.7 2.9
42,667 and above 50 1.4 2.0 0.7
Source : own calculations using grouped data from September
earnings censuses in 1988 (Statistical Yearbook, 
1988, Table 4.9, p .70) and 1990 (information provided 
by CSO).
Notes : 1) Pareto interpolation within ranges from grouped
data using the INEQ package written by F.Cowell, LSE. 
2) The 12,OOOFt annual tax allowance for all 
employees is included in the calculations (the 
brackets in the first column therefore refer to total 
earnings rather than just taxable earnings). No 





























































































Number of children for whom family allowance paid 
as percent of all children aged 0-14. 1950-1990
Figure 1
Sources:
(i) number of children for whom family allowance paid 
1950: Ferge (1991a) p .22
1959-83: Nepszava lap es konyvkiado, 1986, 1987.
1986, 1987: Statistical Yearbook 1987, Table 20.7, p.334 
1985, 1988, 1989 : Statistical Yearbook 1989, Table 20.6, p.318 
1990 : Statistical Yearbook 1990, Table 15.9, p.239
(ii) number of children aged 0-14 (1 Jan)
1949, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985-89: Statistical Yearbook 1988, Table 3.2 p.38
1990: Statistical Yearbook 1990, Table 2.2 p.25







































































































level of family allowance payments 
































































































Notes and Sources for Figure 2
Note:
Average family allowance per family and per child have been calculated from 
information on annual total expenditure and on numbers of families and of 
children in receipt. The 2 child rate is for a family where both parents are 
present and prior to 1975 is the rate for workers in the state sector; in each 
year we take for this series the rate applying in August, except in 1984-85 
when (due to our lack of information on the August rate) we take the rate 
applying earlier in the year.
Sources:
i) Annual expenditure on family allowance
1949- 52: Statistical Yearbook 1961, p .271 
1953-64: Statistical Yearbook 1964, p.282 
1965: Stati stical Yearbook 1965, p.292 
1966-73: Statistical Yearbook 1973, p .391 
1975-85: World Bank (1992) Table 2.2 p.10 
1986-90: Statistical Yearbook 1990 Table 14.4, p.216
ii) Number of families receiving family allowance
1950- 1989: Statistical Yearbook 1989 Table 1.17, p.22 
1990: Statistical Yearbook 1990, Table 1.16, p.21
iii) Number of children for whom family allowance paid 
see Sources for Figure 1
iv) rate of family allowance for 2 child family 
1950-1983: Nepszava lap es konyvkiado, 1986, 1987.
1984-85: Stati stical Yearbook 1987, (Hungarian edition), Table 20.6, p.253 
1987: Statistical Yearbook 1988, Table 20.6, p.334 
1988-1989: Statistical Yearbook 1989 Table 20.5, p .318 
1990: Statistical Yearbook 1990 p.239 Table 15.9, p.239
v) Average monthly wage
1950-87: Statistical Yearbook 1989, Table 1.14, p.19
1988-90: 1987 figure adjusted by net earnings index given in Statistical 










































































































Share of total family allowance expenditure 
going to each decile of the pre-allowance income distribution. 1987
Figure 3
Deciles of pre-allowance income




























































































Notes and Sources for Figure 3
Note:
The distribution in each case is the individual distribution of equivalised 
household income, pre-family allowance. The OECD equivalence scale is 
described in the text. The CSO equivalence scale is as follows:
child under 3 0.45 
child aged 3-5 0.5 
child aged 6-10 0.6 
child aged 11-14 0.7 
child aged 15-18 0.95 
economically active person 1.0 
inactive man aged 19-59 0.9 
inactive women aged 19-54 0.9 
inactive man aged 60+ 0.8 
inactive woman aged 55+ 0.8 
addition for head of household 0.2
Source:
1988 Income Survey microdata - see Appendix;





























































































Share of total family allowance expenditure 
going to each decile of the pre-allowance net income distribution. 1987
a) the individual distribution of pre-family allowance income.
Equivalence Scale
decile per capita CS0 OECD household
1 23.5 21.3 18.3 5.3
2 16.0 14.0 13.5 8.7
3 12.4 12.9 12.0 10.1
4 10.7 10.3 11.1 11.3
5 9.1 8.9 9.3 11.0
6 7.4 7.6 8.3 12.0
7 7.0 6.9 7.6 10.4
8 5.3 6.3 6.9 10.3
9 4.1 5.5 6.2 10.1
10 4.6 6.3 6.7 10.9
a) the household distribution of pre-family allowance income. 
Equivalence Scale
decile per capita CSO OECD household
1 25.8 21.7 16.0 2.0
2 15.8 13.9 12.3 5.1
3 12.5 12.8 12.1 7.4
4 10.7 10.2 11.4 9.1
5 8.4 9.2 10.1 11.9
6 7.2 7.5 9.1 11.9
7 6.6 6.8 8.3 13.6
8 4.8 6.0 7.4 12.7
9 4.0 5.6 6.4 12.9
10 4.2 6.1 6.9 13.4
Note: in the individual distribution, each household is weighted by its number 
of members. In the household distribution, each household receives a weight 
equal to one. The figures for the individual distribution are illustrated in 
Figure 3.
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